10 July 2001
This is a new article. As such is has been set to unassessed. It is classified as a stub, and categories require improvement. July 10, 2001: FBI Agent Sends Memo Warning that Unusual Number of Muslim Extremists Are Learning to Fly in Arizona Phoenix, Arizona, FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum warning about suspicious activities involving a group of Middle Eastern men taking flight training lessons in Arizona. The memo is titled: “Zakaria Mustapha Soubra; IT-OTHER (Islamic Army of the Caucasus),” because it focuses on Zakaria Soubra, a Lebanese flight student in Prescott, Arizona, and his connection with a terror group in Chechnya that has ties to al-Qaeda. It is subtitled: “Osama bin Laden and Al-Muhjiroun supporters attending civil aviation universities/colleges in Arizona.” 5/22/2002; ARIZONA REPUBLIC, 7/24/2003 Williams’ memo is based on an investigation of Sorba that Williams had begun in 2000 (see April 2000), but he had trouble pursuing because of the low priority the Arizona FBI office gave terror investigations (see April 2000-June 2001). Additionally, Williams had been alerted to suspicions about radical militants and aircraft at least three other times (see October 1996; 1998; November 1999-August 2001). In the memo, Williams does the following: Names nine other suspect students from Pakistan, India, Kenya, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002 Hijacker Hani Hanjour, attending flight school in Arizona in early 2001 and probably continuing into the summer of 2001 (see Summer 2001), is not one of the students, but, as explained below, it seems two of the students know him. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 ; WASHINGTON POST, 7/25/2003 Notes that he interviewed some of these students, and heard some of them make hostile comments about the US. Additionally, he noticed that they were suspiciously well informed about security measures at US airports. ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002 Notes an increasing, “inordinate number of individuals of investigative interest” taking flight lessons in Arizona. ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 Suspects that some of the ten people he has investigated are connected to al-Qaeda. CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 One person on the list, Ghassan al Sharbi, will be arrested in Pakistan in March 2002 with al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida (see March 28, 2002). Al Sharbi attended a flight school in Prescott, Arizona. He also apparently attended the training camps in Afghanistan and swore loyalty to bin Laden in the summer of 2001. He apparently knows Hani Hanjour in Arizona (see October 1996-Late April 1999). He also is the roommate of Soubra, the main target of the memo. ANGELES TIMES, 1/24/2003; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 521 Discovers that one of them was communicating through an intermediary with Abu Zubaida. This apparently is a reference to Hamed al Sulami, who had been telephoning a Saudi imam known to be Zubaida’s spiritual advisor. Al Sulami is an acquaintance of Hanjour in Arizona (see October 1996-Late April 1999). NEWS (SAN JOSE), 5/23/2002; 9/11 COMMISSION, 7/24/2004, PP. 520-521, 529 Discusses connections between several of the students and a radical group called Al-Muhajiroun. NEWS (SAN JOSE), 5/23/2002 This group supported bin Laden, and issued a fatwa, or call to arms, that included airports on a list of acceptable terror targets. PRESS, 5/22/2002 Soubra, the main focus of the memo, is a member of Al-Muhajiroun and an outspoken radical. He met with Sheikh Omar Bakri Mohammed, the leader of Al-Muhajiroun in Britain, and started an Arizona chapter of the organization. After 9/11, some US officials will suspect that Soubra has ties to al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. He will be held two years, then deported to Lebanon in 2004. ANGELES TIMES, 10/28/2001; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/24/2003; ARIZONA REPUBLIC, 5/2/2004; ARIZONA MONTHLY, 11/2004 Though Williams doesn’t include it in his memo, in the summer of 1998, Bakri publicized a fax sent by bin Laden to him that listed al-Qaeda’s four objectives in fighting the US. The first objective was “bring down their airliners.” (see Summer 1998). ANGELES TIMES, 10/28/2001 Warns of a possible “effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to the US to attend civil aviation universities and colleges” 5/22/2002 , so they can later hijack aircraft. ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002 Recommends that the “FBI should accumulate a listing of civil aviation universities and colleges around the country. FBI field offices with these types of schools in their area should establish appropriate liaison. FBI headquarters should discuss this matter with other elements of the US intelligence community and task the community for any information that supports Phoenix’s suspicions.” REPUBLIC, 7/24/2003 (The FBI has already done this, but because of poor FBI communications, Williams is not aware of the report.) Recommends that the FBI ask the State Department to provide visa data on flight school students from Middle Eastern countries, which will facilitate FBI tracking efforts. YORK TIMES, 5/4/2002 The memo is addressed to the following FBI Agents: Dave Frasca, chief of the Radical Fundamentalist Unit (RFU) at FBI headquarters; Elizabeth Harvey Matson, Mark Connor and Fred Stremmel, Intelligence Operations Specialists in the RFU; Rod Middleton, acting chief of the Usama bin Laden Unit (UBLU); Jennifer Maitner, an Intelligence Operations Specialist in the UBLU; Jack Cloonan, an agent on the New York FBI’s bin Laden unit, the I-49 squad; (see January 1996 and Spring 2000). Michael S. Butsch, an agent on another New York FBI squad dealing with other Sunni terrorists. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 7/10/2001 ; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 However, the memo is not uploaded into the FBI’s information system until the end of the month and is apparently not received by all these people (see July 27, 2001 and after). Williams also shares some concerns with the CIA (see (July 27, 2001)). NEWS (SAN JOSE), 5/23/2002 One anonymous government official who has seen the memo says, “This was as actionable a memo as could have been written by anyone.” 5/27/2002 However, the memo is merely marked “routine,” rather than “urgent.” It is generally ignored, not shared with other FBI offices, and the recommendations are not taken. One colleague in New York replies at the time that the memo is “speculative and not very significant.” ZEIT (HAMBURG), 10/1/2002; US CONGRESS, 7/24/2003, PP. 135 Williams is unaware of many FBI investigations and leads that could have given weight to his memo. Authorities later claim that Williams was only pursuing a hunch, but one familiar with classified information says, “This was not a vague hunch. He was doing a case on these guys.” NEWS (SAN JOSE), 5/23/2002 July 10, 2001: Urgent CIA Request for Funds to Immediately Deal with Bin Laden Is Denied On this date, CIA Director George Tenet and CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black give the White House an urgent al-Qaeda briefing that, if heeded, Black later believes could have stopped bin Laden. Tenet and Black strongly suggest that both an overall strategy and immediate covert or military action against bin Laden are needed (see July 10, 2001). According to a 2006 book by journalist Bob Woodward that is likely paraphrasing Black, one of Woodward’s sources for his book, “Black calculated that if White House had given him $500 million of covert action funds right then and reasonable authorizations from the president to go kill bin Laden, he would have been able to make great strides if not do away with him.… Over the last two years—and as recently as March 2001—the CIA had deployed paramilitary teams five times into Afghanistan to work with the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, a loose federation of militias and tribes in the north. The CIA had about 100 sources and subsources operating throughout Afghanistan. Just give him the money and the authority and he might be able to bring bin Laden’s head back in a box.” 2006, PP. 77-78; NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, 9/29/2006 Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, George J. Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black Category Tags: Hunt for Bin Laden July 10, 2001: CIA Director Tenet Briefed about Al-Qaeda; Urgent White House Meeting Results CIA counterterrorism chief Cofer Black and Richard Blee, a manager responsible for the CIA’s bin Laden unit, meet with CIA Director George Tenet and review the latest intelligence about al-Qaeda. Black lays out a case based on communications intercepts and other intelligence suggesting a growing chance that al-Qaeda will attack the US soon. There is no smoking gun per se, but there is a huge volume of data indicating an attack is coming (see July 9-10, 2001). The case is so compelling—Tenet will later say it “literally made my hair stand on end”—that Tenet decides to brief the White House on it this same day (see July 10, 2001). POST, 10/1/2006; TENET, 2007, PP. 151 Entity Tags: White House, Rich B., George J. Tenet, Cofer Black, Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, Central Intelligence Agency Category Tags: Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics July 10, 2001: CIA Director Gives Urgent Warning to White House of Imminent, Multiple, Simultaneous Al-Qaeda Attacks, Possibly within US Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet in the White House. This picture is actually taken on October 8, 2001, and President Bush is elsewhere in the room. Eric Draper / White House CIA Director George Tenet finds the briefing that counterterrorism chief Cofer Black gave him earlier in the day (see July 10, 2001) so alarming that he calls National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice from his car as he heads to the White House and says he needs to see her right away, even though he has regular weekly meetings with her. POST, 10/1/2006 Tenet and Black let a third CIA official, Richard Blee, who is responsible for Alec Station, the CIA’s bin Laden unit, brief Rice on the latest intelligence. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke are also present. NEWSPAPERS, 10/2/2006 'Significant Attack' - Blee starts by saying, “There will be a significant terrorist attack in the coming weeks or months!” He argues that it is impossible to pick the specific day, saying Osama bin Laden “will attack when he believes the attack will be successful.” He mentions a range of threat information including: A warning related to Chechen leader Ibn Khattab (see (July 9, 2001)) and seven pieces of intelligence the CIA recently received indicating there would soon be a terrorist attack (see July 9-10, 2001); A mid-June statement by bin Laden to trainees that there would be an attack in the near future (see Mid-June 2001); Information that talks about moving toward decisive acts; Late-June information saying a “big event” was forthcoming; Two separate bits of information collected “a few days before the meeting” in which people predicted a “stunning turn of events” in the weeks ahead. This may be a reference to intercepts of calls in Yemen, possibly involving the father-in-law of 9/11 hijacker Khalid Almihdhar (see June 30-July 1, 2001). Multiple, Simultaneous Attacks in US Possible - Blee says that the attacks will be “spectacular,” they will be designed to inflict mass casualties against US facilities and interests, there may be multiple, simultaneous attacks, and they may be in the US itself. He outlines the CIA’s efforts to disrupt al-Qaeda by spreading incorrect word that the attack plans have been compromised, in the hope that this will cause a delay in the attack. But he says this is not enough and that the CIA should go on the attack. Blee also discounts the possibility of disinformation, as bin Laden’s threats are known to the public in the Middle East and there will be a loss of face, funds, and popularity if they are not carried out. Blee urges that the US take a “proactive approach” by using the Northern Alliance. 2007, PP. 151-4 Author Bob Woodward will later write: “Black emphasizes that this amounts to a strategic warning, meaning the problem is so serious that it requires an overall plan and strategy. Second, this is a major foreign policy problem that needs to be addressed immediately. They need … to take action that moment—covert, military, whatever—to thwart bin Laden. The United States has human and technical sources, and all the intelligence is consistent.” 2006, PP. 80; WASHINGTON POST, 10/1/2006 Richard Clarke expresses his agreement with the CIA about the threat’s seriousness, and Black says, “This country needs to go on a war footing now.” Rice's Response - There are conflicting accounts about the CIA’s reading of Rice’s response. According to Woodward: “Tenet and Black feel they are not getting through to Rice. She is polite, but they feel the brush-off.” They leave the meeting frustrated, seeing little prospect for immediate action. Tenet and Black will both later recall the meeting as the starkest warning they gave the White House on al-Qaeda before 9/11 and one that could have potentially stopped the 9/11 attacks if Rice had acted on it (see July 10, 2001) and conveyed their urgency to President Bush. (Tenet is briefing Bush on a daily basis at this time, but he will later say that Rice has a much better rapport with the president.) Black will say, “The only thing we didn’t do was pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her head.” 2006, PP. 80; WASHINGTON POST, 10/1/2006 Rice says that Bush will align his policy with the new realities and grant new authorities. Writing in 2007, Tenet will say that this response is “just the outcome I had expected and hoped for,” and recall that as they leave the meeting, Blee and Black congratulate each other on having got the administration’s attention. Nevertheless, Rice does not take the requested action until after 9/11. 2007, PP. 153-4 Rice Concerned about Genoa - Clarke will recall in 2006 that Rice focuses on the possible threat to Bush at an upcoming summit meeting in Genoa, Italy (see June 13, 2001 and July 20-22, 2001). Rice and Bush have already been briefed about the Genoa warning by this time (see July 5, 2001). Rice also promises to quickly schedule a high-level White House meeting on al-Qaeda. However, that meeting does not take place until September 4, 2001 (see September 4, 2001). NEWSPAPERS, 10/2/2006 Rice also directs that Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Attorney General John Ashcroft be given the same briefing, and they receive it a short time later (see July 11-17, 2001). Meeting Not Mentioned in 9/11 Commission Report - The meeting will not be mentioned in the 9/11 Commission Report (see August 4, 2002), and there will be controversy when it is fully revealed in 2006 (see September 29, 2006, September 30-October 3, 2006, and October 1-2, 2006). Entity Tags: Rich B., Stephen J. Hadley, White House, Osama bin Laden, Richard A. Clarke, George J. Tenet, Al-Qaeda, Central Intelligence Agency, Cofer Black, Donald Rumsfeld, Condoleezza Rice, John Ashcroft Category Tags: Key Warnings, Warning Signs, Counterterrorism Policy/Politics Category:Timeline